Guelzo takes issues with armchair historians and battlefield visitors who criticize commanding generals for their lackluster decision making, those who argue that the Battle of Gettysburg could have gone completely differently, or those who believe that the Battle of Gettysburg could have ended the war. In his opinion, this catastrophic engagement was neither total nor decisive. Guelzo contends that these complications accounted not only for the frustrating delays, mishaps, and horrific casualty figures, but they also minimized the damage done to noncombatants and private property. In doing so, he reveals the intricacies of leadership as well as the topographical, logistical, and disciplinary difficulties inherent in waging a massive, three-day engagement. He delves deeply into the backgrounds and personalities of senior and junior officers and discusses how personality conflicts, political ambition, feelings of paranoia, and traumatic experiences in battle shaped their command decisions. Guelzo shows how the contingency of Civil War combat and the contested politics of memory shaped the Battle of Gettysburg. Guelzo’s work emphasizes the complex realities of waging war in nineteenth-century America and he argues that even in the face of Gettysburg’s horrifying casualties, northern Americans renewed their commitment to preserving what they considered to be the “virtues of democracy and preaching its worth as the one true and natural system of human society” (480–81). Guelzo’s Gettysburg: The Last Invasion is a beautifully written, compelling study of the Gettysburg Campaign that blends analysis of commanders’ decision making with explorations of the experiences of soldiers and civilians.

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